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Not so long ago Japan seemed to be left 
out on the diplomatic stage, notably 
when it decided not to join China’s 
newly established Asian Investment and 
Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in 2015.  But 
while no one can deny China’s 
impressive global outreach under the 
banner of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), Japan has not been sitting idly by.  
Quite the contrary, Japan is playing a 
leading role in shaping the concept of 
free and open Indo-Pacific region, and 
has positioned itself as an important 
political actor that upholds the rule of 
law under its Free and Open Indo-
Pacific Strategy (FOIP).  As China 
becomes more and more assertive 
economically and militarily, 
strengthening ties with Japan becomes 
all the more important for the European 
Union (EU).  As a strategic partner of 
Japan, the EU more than ever needs to 
work with Japan in upholding the liberal 
international order. 
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Prime Minister Abe formally introduced the 
FOIP Strategy on the occasion of the Fourth 
International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD VI) held in Nairobi in 
August 2016. However, he touched upon the 
original concept of the two oceans (the Indian 
and Pacific) coming together already in 2007, 
in speech for the Indian Parliament, predating 
the announcement of China’s BRI in 2013.  
2007 also was the year that the concept of the 
Quad, the quadrilateral grouping of Japan, 
Australia, India and the United States, was 
born.  Japan’s FOIP Strategy has inspired the 
United States: the Trump administration has 
simply adopted the same concept of a free and 
open Indo-Pacific to replace the Obama 
administration’s “pivot to Asia”.  Japan’s 
recent diplomatic activities are underpinned by 
what Abe calls “a diplomacy that takes a 
panoramic perspective of the world map” and 
“a proactive contribution to peace”.  
 
RULES-BASED 
Japan’s foreign policy can be summarized as: 
rules-based, inclusive and transparent, and 
focused on quality.  In this Japan’s foreign 
policy differs decisively from China’s.  The 
rules-based order is what Tokyo attaches the 
greatest importance to.  Japan’s strategy is 
about maintaining a free and open 
international economic and maritime order 
based on the rule of law.  As the importance 
of the rule of law is perhaps not as self-
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evident in developing countries as the 
democratic countries think, Japan is not just 
preaching this, but is actually demonstrating it.   
 
A concrete example is the G7 Ise-Shima 
Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure 
Investment.  Japan brought to the attention of 
the international community the importance of 
quality infrastructure investment when the 
country hosted the G7 in May 2016.  Under 
the Japanese presidency, the G7 leaders 
endorsed these principles.  Another example 
of Japan’s push for the rules-based order is its 
emphasis on the freedom of navigation.  This 
principle is one of the oldest of customary 
international law and it is the basis of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.  This is also one of the priorities of the 
Quad.  Prime Minister Abe initiated the 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, but it 
lost momentum as China perceived it as a 
form of containment against it.  The idea of 
the Quad is gaining ground again, however, in 
view of China’s assertiveness in the East and 
South China Seas and against the backdrop of 
the July 2016 ruling by the United Nations 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, which 
declared China’s claims illegal.   
 
At the same time, Japan and China are 
cooperating more and more.  After initially 
keeping its distance, Japan joined the BRI in 
July 2017, and it concluded a memorandum on 
business cooperation in third countries in May 
2018.  Japan is aiming to bring quality and 
effective governance to the BRI projects.   
China can learn from Japan’s know-how, and 
it is an opportunity to promote the rules of the 
existing liberal order.  Japan too can learn 
from China’s speed, risk-taking and, crucially, 
its know-how of strategies for promotion and 
public diplomacy.   
 
JAPAN’S ACTIVE DIPLOMACY 
Japan’s surge in political leadership is backed 
by a high number of visits, not only by Abe 
himself but also by Foreign Minister Kono 
(who was appointed in August 2017).  While 
his predecessor, Mr. Kishida, visited 51 
countries and regions during his term of 4 
years and 2 months, Kono has already visited 
52 countries in just over 13 months.  If Abe 
has a clear strategic vision for Japan, Kono’s 
vigorous diplomatic engagement is driven 
partly by his own sense of frustration over the 
fact that the presence of Chinese money can 
be seen everywhere in Africa and the Middle 
East.  If Japan merely continues the same 
policies, it will not stand a chance of protecting 
its interests.1   
 
At home, Japan is busy hosting high-level 
summits and international fora.  Among the 
most recent highlights are: the 7th Japan-China-
Republic of Korea Trilateral Summit; the 8th 
Pacific Island Leaders Meeting (PALM);2 the 
TICAD ministerial meeting; and the 10th 
Mekong-Japan summit.3  Not only have these 
meetings been a perfect venue for promoting 
Japan’s FOIP Strategy, it is also where Japan is 
showing that there are alternatives to China’s 
development projects and that Japan can 
provide other options for the region’s 
connectivity.  If China’s BRI lacks clarity as to 
which projects can qualify to be included, 
Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure4, one 
of the instruments to implement the FOIP 
Strategy, provides a detailed plan of inclusive, 
sustainable, resilient projects.  It promotes the 
Japanese assistance, through both public and 
private funding, and empowers existing 
domestic and multilateral development 
agencies and banks5 under the banner of the 
FOIP Strategy.  In the Mekong countries, 
Japan is the largest investor $220 billion as 
compared to China’s $123 billion over the 
period of 2003-2017.6  And Japan’s investment 
in the region is growing faster than that of 
China.  Normative Japan is also on show in 
these international fora.  At the recent PALM 
meeting, for example, Abe stated: “it is the rule 
of law that gives protection to the nations, big 
and small, for their inherent rights”.  As 
another example, Japan’s engagement in the 
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Pacific Islands ranges from dispatching 
business missions and a capacity-building 
programme for sustainable ocean 
management, to funding the construction of a 
climate change research centre.   
 
Japan is benefitting from having a very 
competitive rival like China for a neighbour.  
Effectively, the rise of China has pushed Japan 
to take a hard look at its own policies and 
strategy, and to think strategically about how 
to be more attractive to the countries in the 
region.  Japan has taken stock of lessons 
learned from its own long experience as a 
leading donor and investor, and has studied 
what it can offer that China cannot.  One can 
say that China’s debt traps and coercive way of 
cooperation have given Japan a chance to 
show its open, inclusive and quality-oriented 
way of engagement.   
 
Japan is also benefitting from the disruptive 
and self-destructive nature of the Trump 
administration.  The single most devastating 
failure of US foreign policy in the region has 
been the pulling out of the Transpacific Trade 
Partnership (TPP).  President Trump may 
have thought that with his withdrawal the deal 
would crumble; that was hardly the case.  
Japan jumped right in the power vacuum in 
order to lead the trade deal without the US.  
TPP was signed by 11 members in March 
2018.  Even without the US, the TPP 
countries account for 14.4% of global trade.  
Japanese leadership was critical in bringing the 
remaining 11 members to sign off on the deal 
which is essentially a compilation of the 
existing trade rules under the WTO in the Asia 
Pacific.   
 
In addition, the EU-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) was signed in 
July 2018, making it the biggest trade deal for 
the EU.  Japan is also leading the negotiation 
for the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP),7 which would become 
the world’s largest trade agreement.  Under the 
banner of “fighting protectionism”, Japan is 
determined to be at the centre of creating and 
upholding a fair and open rules-based trade 
order.    
 
The thing about the rules-based order is that it 
holds all members in a deal accountable to the 
existing rules and norms.  A majority or a 
minority shareholder, a big or small country, an 
investor or a host country, rules constrain 
them all.  Even the country investing the most 
cannot get away with impunity.  Japan and 
other like-minded nations must articulate that 
respecting the rules matters.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU 
It is time for the EU to look beyond China and 
take its relations with Japan seriously.  But the 
fact that the EU-Japan EPA, which amounts 
to nearly 40% of global trade, caught little 
media attention in Europe shows that China is 
still far more influential than Japan.  Though 
the EU is becoming more skeptical of China’s 
BRI, too many EU strategists still turn a blind 
eye to China’s coercive way of pushing 
unsustainable infrastructure projects that only 
burden the recipient countries with heavy 
debts.  Senior management of the AIIB 
includes members from the EU member states.  
Europeans are testing, in a way whether they 
can effectively have influence from inside and 
“teach” the Chinese how to operate 
development assistance.  This author heard 
one high-ranking AIIB official state at a 
conference in Brussels in early 2018 that “the 
bank will direct funds where the recipient 
countries can generate revenue”. It sounds like 
a hopeful and lucrative promise, but 
experience shows that some of the actual funds 
have gone to projects for which the economic 
rationale is weak. 
 
Why should the EU care about a Japanese 
concept for the Indo-Pacific?   If the EU still 
assumes that all roads lead through 
Washington and that Japan’s foreign policy 
takes its bearings from the US, it has missed 
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the train already.  As former Australian Prime 
Minister Malcolm Turnbull put it, the region is 
a mesh of strategic partnerships; gone are the 
days of the conventional hub-and-spokes 
structure with the US in the centre.  
Geographically, Japan’s grand strategy is 
reaching ever closer to Europe.  While the 
Pacific Ocean may not ring a bell with many 
Europeans (except for France and the UK), 
the Indian Ocean should, as it is Europe’s 
broader neighbourhood, linked to the EU via 
the Persian Gulf.   
 
Rhetorically, Japan’s FOIP Strategy is in line 
with the 2016 EU Global Strategy in terms of its 
commitment to effective governance and the 
rule of law.  It is a good sign that the EU’s 
version of the connectivity concept 
acknowledges Japan’s FOIP Strategy, albeit 
modestly.  Politically, the recently signed EU-
Japan EPA as well as the EU-Japan Strategic 
Partnership Agreement have raised EU-Japan 
relations to a higher level.   
 
However, most crucially, there is an apparent 
lack of leadership on Japan-related political 
and strategic matters.  There is almost no one 
who can speak for Japan in Brussels and in 
other EU capitals.  There is no Japan chair or 
senior fellow in major think tanks in the EU, 
in stark contrast to the US where there are at 
least a handful in Washington.  This leadership 
vacuum is hurting EU-Japan relations.  If this 
vacuum were filled, EU-Japan and EU-China 
relations could complement each other, doing 
away with the current stovepipes.  For 
example, Japan scholars and observers should 
be invited to EU-China events and vice versa.  
EU-Korea relations should also be included.  
EU scholars and strategists would gain a much 
broader picture and understand the sensitivities 
of the geopolitics of the region.  One could 
begin to appreciate the fact that a healthy mix 
of cooperation and competition is a pragmatic 
way forward for peaceful and prosperous co-
existence in this part of the world.   
 
Japan needs the EU to step up in sharing the 
responsibility for maintaining the international 
order that both have benefitted from so much.  
Ensuring that this order is upheld is as much in 
the EU’s interest as in Japan’s.   
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